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W.: Divorce--Wife's Right to Obtain Alimony After Valid Ex Parte Divo

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
EX
DIVORCE.-D sued P in an ex parte proceeding in Florida.

DivoRcE-WiFE's RIGHT TO OBTAIN ALIMONY AFTER VALID
PARTE

Later, P sued D in Washington, D.C., for alimony and maintenance.
D was personally served, and he appeared to contest the suit. Held,
that the Florida proceeding was invalid and therefore P and D are
still man and wife and she is entitled to separate maintenance for
herself and child. On appeal, the court held that the lower court
should not have questioned the validity of the Florida decree but
should have allowed P's claim by using the court's general equity
powers and recognizing that the right to maintenance is a right of
the wife which survives an ex parte divorce. In the event that D
could defeat P by interposing equitable defenses, then, and only
then, could the lower court question the validity of the Florida
decree. Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Where the husband has obtained a valid ex parte divorce (one
based on constructive or substituted service on the wife and the
wife does not appear to contest the suit) there is a split of authority
as to the wife's right to sue for alimony in a subsequent proceeding.
Based on a numerical count of states which have litigated this question, the majority view precludes the wife from obtaining alimony
in a subsequent action.
Of major importance in these cases is the effect to be given to
the full faith and credit doctrine under the Federal Constitution,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942); the concept of divisible divorce, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948); and the principle of res judicata. A consideration of these
points should lead a court to recognize that there is a distinction
between claims based upon statute or rules allowing alimony after
divorce, and ordinary claims for alimony based upon the marital
relation.
The principal case says that the full faith and credit clause
does not require the court to recognize the foreign decree in so far
as it cut off the wife's rights to maintenance under local law, and
"the question of recognition or non-recognition, even as to the
issue of maintenance is left squarely up to each individual forum
to be solved there in conformity with its public policy and in the
light of the many conflicting interests and considerations patently
involved". In Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (1950), the court
said that the Federal Constitution did not compel recognition of an
ex parte divorce granted in a foreign country as terminating the
wife's right to alimony. And, even though the court can recognize
the decree under the rules of comity as dissolving the marital status,
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the court can disregard any part of the decree which co,,cerns alimony, and apply local rules of law in determining a wife's right to
alimony.
It follows that local rules of law could allow a court to recognize
an ex parte divorce awarded in a sister state under the rules of
comity even though such decree is not entitled to full faith and
credit under the Federal Constitution.
In Estin v. Estin, supra, the court said "the fact that the marital capacity has been changed does not mean that every legal incident of the marriage was necessarily affected". The court held that
a sister state court in an ex parte divorce action could not terminate
a wife's right to maintenance adjudicated in another state prior to
the divorce. From the broad language of the case has arisen the
basis of the "divisible divorce doctrine" which courts can use in
holding the ex parte divorce valid as to marital status termination
but of no validity in regard to the wife's right to alimony. See
Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1287 (1951).
Obviously a court having no personal jurisdiction of the wife
can not decide her right to alimony as alimony involves an in
personam proceeding. Therefore, there is no basis for saying that
an ex parte divorce is res judicata as to the question of alimony
unless the right to alimony terminates with the dissolution of the
marital relation.
What is the effect of an argument that an cx parte divorce raises
a presumption that the wife was at fault and therefore barred from
alimony? It has been held that there is no such presumption due
to the fact that the wife did not contest the suit. Thurston v.
Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N.W. 1017 (1894).
Does it matter that the wife had no actual notice of the ex
parte proceeding? Kenna v. Kenna, 222 Mo. App. 825, 10 S.W.2d
344 (1928), held that such lack of notice was of no help to the wife
as she was precluded from subsequent alimony even though she
had no actual notice. However, Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476,
31 S.W. 977 (1910), gave weight to the fact that the wife had no
actual notice.
In 1869, an Ohio court said that a statute granting the right of
alimony to a "wife" entitled her to sue for alimony after her husband divorced her because the term "wife" designates a person
and not an actual existing marital relation. Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio
St. 502, 2 Am. Rep. 415 (1869). It has been held that a statute
forbidding alimony to a wife after her husband has secured a
divorce has no application where the husband's divorce was ob.
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tained in an ex parte proceeding. Toncray v. Toncray, supra.
New Jersey has a statute which allows a wife to obtain alimony
after her husband divorces her. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-34-23 (1952).
New York allows a divorced wife to obtain maintenance from her
former husband. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1170-b (1953).
Those courts allowing a wife's claim for alimony after her
husband obtains an ex parte divorce do so for various reasons. Some
of these reasons are: (1) a wife can not get alimony if she gets an
ex parte divorce so she can not be barred from alimony after her
husband obtains an ex parte divorce, Davis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37,
197 Pac. 241 (1921); (2) it is a duty of the state to protect its citizens and "no obligations of comity are paramount to this duty",
Turner v. Turner, 44 Ala. 437 (1870); (3) an ex parte divorce does not
relieve a husband from all responsibilities incidental to the contract
of marriage, Pawley v. Pawley, supra; Gray v. Gray, 61 F. Supp.
367 (D.C. Mich. 1945); Davis v. Davis, 165 Wash. 172, 8 P.2d 286
(1931); (4) an ex parte divorce is res judicata as to the marital
relation, but "all other questions are res nova", Thurston v. Thurston, supra; (5) Oregon court has inherent jurisdiction to award
alimony upon an independent suit after divorce, Rooda v. Rooda,
185 Ore. 140, 202 P.2d 638 (1948) (this was dissenting view of three
judges); (6) court found no connection between divorce and alimony in the Tennessee statutes and therefore held that the court
could decree one without the other. Toncray v. Toncray, supra;
(7) an ex parte divorce denying alimony is not entitled to full
faith and credit as regards the alimony question, Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954).
Some of the reasons given by courts who refuse such claims of
the wife are: (1) a decree of divorce terminates the husband's obligation to support a former spouse, Corn. ex rel. McVay v. McVay,
177 Pa. Super. 623, 112 A.2d 649 (1955); Staub v. Staub, 170 Md.
202, 183 At. 605 (1936) (here the wife obtained the ex parte divorce
and later sued for alimony); McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183
N.W. 377 (1921); .Anglin v. Anglin, 211 Miss. 405, 51 So.2d 781
(1951); (2) parties must be married before the court will entertain
a suit for separate maintenance, Shain v. Shain, 324 Mass. 603, 88
N.E.2d 143 (1949); right to sue for alimony or support is limited
to the period when the parties are married, Dimon v. Dimon, 111
Adv. Col. App. 329, 244 P.2d 972 (1952); (3) statute allowing wife
to sue for alimony without divorce will not cover case where wife
is no longer a wife due to an ex parte divorce, Bond v. Bond, 235
N.G. 754, 71 S.E.2d 53 (1952); Atkins v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54
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N.E.2d 488 (1944); Joynerv. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62 S.E. 182 (1908);
(4) the law of Kansas says that the court granting the divorce is
the only court which can award alimony and this also is the law
where an out of state court grants the divorce, Roe v. Roe, 52 Kan.
724, 35 Pac. 808 (1894).
The problem involved in the prindpal case has never been
decided in West Virginia. It is obvious that excellent arguments
can be made both pro and con in regard to the wife's attempt to
obtain alimony after her husband has received an ex parte divorce.
By statute, West Virginia has gone no further than to allow an
action for separate maintenance brought by the wife while the
marriage relation exists. W. VA. CODE c. 48, art. 2, § 29 (Michie
1955). As pointed out in the Revisers' Note, this statute is just a
codification of existing West Virginia law. The rationale which
allowed such claims before any statute authorized them seems to be
that the common law imposed a duty on a husband to support his
wife and such duty continues as long as the parties remain married.
See, e.g., Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330, 80 S.E. 846 (1913). There is
no authority saying that the common law imposed such duty on a
husband after he ceased being a husband due to a valid divorce.
Therefore, our courts may feel that before they can award alimony
after a divorce there must be a statute authorizing such action.
And in the absence of such a statute, it is plausible to argue that a
wife can not secure alimony in West Virginia unless she asks for it
before the marital relation is terminated. "Maintenance of the
wife by the husband is alone incident to the marriage relation.
There is no duty to furnish maintenance when that relation does
not exist." Chapman v. Parsons, 66 W. Va. 307, 66 S.E. 641 (1909).
But, it does not follow that the same argument would be sound
as against a wife seeking alimony after her husband secures an ex
parte divorce, until, at least, all of the equities in the wife's favor
have been weighed. It seems harsh to arbitrarily exclude a wife
from alimony merely because she did not contest the ex parte divorce
action. She should not lose her right to alimony merely because her
husband travels to some distant state and divorces her. It should take
more facts to show a waiver of alimony in an ex parte divorce of a
sister state than it would to show a waiver of alimony in a West
Virginia divorce action.
It is submitted that if the balance of equities shows the wife to
have been wronged she should have a legal remedy.
G. H. W.
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